Rating Sheet for Family Steering Committee 
Questions Submitted to the 9/11 Commission 
for Answers & Investigation

Grid Layout

Questions to be rated

Box  1

Box  2

Box  3

Rating System: Please check box (column) 1, 2 or 3 for each question

A check in Box 1:
This question has been satisfactorily answered by the 9/11 Commission Report.

A check in Box 2:
This question has been addressed in the Report, but not adequately answered.

A check in Box 3:
This question has been generally ignored in or omitted from the Report.

The Family Steering Committee 
Statement and Questions Regarding 
the 9/11 Commission Interview 
with President Bush

Statement and Questions 1-23 submitted February 16, 2004
Questions 24-39 submitted March 18, 2004

Before an audience of the American people, the Commission must ask President Bush in sworn testimony, the following questions:

Questions Column

Rating  boxes/ columns

1

2

3

1. As Commander-in-Chief on the morning of 9/11, why didn’t you return immediately to Washington, DC or the National Military Command Center once you became aware that America was under attack? Not happy about it

x

•  At specifically what time did you become aware that America was under attack?

x

•  Who informed you of this fact?

x

2. On the morning of 9/11, who was in charge of our country while you were away from the National Military Command Center? Were you informed or consulted about all decisions made in your absence?

x

3. What defensive action did you personally order to protect our nation during the crisis on September 11th?

x

•  What time were these orders given, and to whom?

x

•  What orders were carried out?

x

•  What was the result of such orders?

x

•  Were any such orders not carried out?

x

4. In your opinion, why was our nation so utterly unprepared for an attack on our own soil?

x

5. U.S. Navy Captain Deborah Loewer, the Director of the White House Situation Room, informed you of the first airliner hitting Tower One of the World Trade Center before you entered the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Please explain the reason why you decided to continue with the scheduled classroom visit, fifteen minutes after learning the first hijacked airliner had hit the World Trade Center. Not happy about it

x

6. Is it normal procedure for the Director of the White House Situation Room to travel with you?

x

•  If so, please cite any prior examples of when this occurred.

x

•  If not normal procedure, please explain the circumstances that led to the White House Situation Room Director being asked to accompany you to Florida during the week of September 11th.

x

7. What plan of action caused you to remain seated after Andrew Card informed you that a second airliner had hit the second tower of the World Trade Center and America was clearly under attack? Not happy about it

x

•  Approximately how long did you remain in the classroom after Card’s message?

X

8. At what time were you made aware that other planes were hijacked in addition to Flight 11 and Flight 175?

x

•  Who notified you?

X

•  What was your course of action as Commander-in-Chief of the United States?

X

9. Beginning with the transition period between the Clinton administration and your own, and ending on 9/11/01, specifically what information (either verbal or written) about terrorists, possible attacks and targets, did you receive from any source?

This would include briefings or communications from

• Out-going Clinton officials

• CIA, FBI, NSA, DoD and other intelligence agencies

• Foreign intelligence, governments, dignitaries or envoys

• National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice

• Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism czar

X

10. Specifically, what did you learn from the August 6, '01, PDB about the terrorist threat that was facing our nation?

X

•  Did you request any follow-up action to take place?

X

•  Did you request any further report be developed and/or prepared?

X

11. As Commander-in-Chief, from May 1, 2001 until September 11, 2001, did you receive any information from any intelligence agency official or agent that UBL was planning to attack this nation on its own soil using airplanes as weapons, targeting New York City landmarks during the week of September 11, 2001 or on the actual day of September 11, 2001?

X

12. What defensive measures did you take in response to pre-9/11 warnings from eleven nations about a terrorist attack, many of which cited an attack in the continental United States?

X

•  Did you prepare any directives in response to these actions?

X

•  If so, with what results?

X

13. As Commander-in-Chief from May 1, 2001 until September 11, 2001, did you or any agent of the United States government carry out any negotiations or talks with UBL, an agent of UBL, or al-Qaeda?

X

• During that same period, did you or any agent of the United States government carry out any negotiations or talks with any foreign government, its agents, or officials regarding UBL?

X

• If so, what resulted?

X

14. Your schedule for September 11, 2001 was in the public domain since September 7, 2001. The Emma E. Booker School is only five miles from the Bradenton Airport, so you, and therefore the children in the classroom, might have been a target for the terrorists on 9/11. What was the intention of the Secret Service in allowing you to remain in the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, even though they were aware America was under attack?

X

15. Please explain why you remained at the Sarasota, Florida, Elementary School for a press conference after you had finished listening to the children read, when as a terrorist target, your presence potentially jeopardized the lives of the children?

X

16. What was the purpose of the several stops of Air Force One on September 11th?

X

• Was Air Force One at any time during the day of September 11th a target of the terrorists?

• Was Air Force One’s code ever breached on September 11th?

17. Was there a reason for Air Force One lifting off without a military escort, even after ample time had elapsed to allow military jets to arrive?

X

18. What prompted your refusal to release the information regarding foreign sponsorship of the terrorists, as illustrated in the inaccessible 28 redacted pages in the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry Report?

X

• What actions have you personally taken since 9/11 to thwart foreign sponsorship of terrorism?

X

19. Who approved the flight of the bin Laden family out of the United States when all commercial flights were grounded, when there was time for only minimal questioning by the FBI, and especially, when two of those same individuals had links to WAMY, a charity suspected of funding terrorism?

X

• Why were bin Laden family members granted that special privilege—a privilege not available to American families whose loved ones were killed on 9/11?

X

20. Please explain why no one in any level of our government has yet been held accountable for the countless failures leading up to and on 9/11?

X

21. Please comment on the fact that UBL’s profile on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives poster does not include the 9/11 attacks.

X

• To your knowledge, when was the last time any agent of our government had contact with UBL?

X

• If prior to 9/11, specifically what was the date of that contact and what was the context of said meeting.

X

22. Do you continue to maintain that Saddam Hussein was linked to al Qaeda?

X

•  What proof do you have of any connection between al-Qaeda and the Hussein regime?

X

23. Which individuals, governments, agencies, institutions, or groups may have benefited from the attacks of 9/11?   Please state specifically how you think they have benefited.

X

24. After the first WTC building was struck, did you receive any information directly or indirectly from the Secret Service agents located in WTC 7?

X

   • If so, what information did you receive?

X

   • Did the Secret Service agents or anyone else accompanying you attempt to call the New York City Secret Service office for information?

X

   • Did the Secret Service agents or anyone else accompanying you attempt to call the Washington Secret Service office?

X

   • Who provided you information, directly or indirectly & what exactly was that information?

X

25. Please describe the role and influence of the President’s Foreign Advisory Council in establishing the administration’s counterterrorism policies.

X

26. In Feb 28, 2001, you released your economic blueprint and stated "to improve INS' focus on service and to reduce the delays in INS processing of immigration applications, the administration proposes a universal 6-month standard for processing all immigration applications." Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, did you or anyone else implement this processing goal in any way? Were any directives, orders or policy guidelines given to INS personnel relating to this issue by anyone?   www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud14.html

X

27. During the second presidential debate on Oct. 11, 2000, as a Presidential candidate you responded to a question about racial discrimination and said that " ...there is other forms of racial profiling that goes on in America. Arab Americans are racially profiled in what's called "secret evidence". www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/2000debates/2ndebate3.html

X

28. On Feb 28, 2001, you issued a memorandum on racial profiling to Attorney General Ashcroft, stating; "I hereby direct you to review the use by Federal law enforcement authorities of race as a factor in conducting stops, searches, and other investigative procedures."   www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010228-1.html

To your knowledge, were directives or communications issued, through Attorney General Ashcroft or anyone else, to any federal agencies, or to any individuals or offices of any agencies, that concerned the racial profiling Arabs or Muslims?

X

X

• Could prohibition of racial profiling have been a factor in the FBI Headquarters personnel continually and “inexplicably” throwing up “roadblocks” and even undermining the field agents’ “desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant in the Moussaoui investigation.” time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html

X

29. In the first few weeks of the Bush administration it has been reported that Andrew Card, Chief of Staff required that all regulations (passed down by the Clinton administration) that had not yet been issued had to be reviewed anew by an official appointed by the new administration, generally, the department secretary.

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010123-4.html

   • Before adopting this blanket policy that delayed the implementation of regulations, did anyone in your administration have any concerns about delaying those that related to security issues, such as National Security or aircraft/airport security?

X

   • Was any special course of action taken regarding these regulations?

X

30. In July, 2001, an executive order was issued which “blocks all property and interests in property of the Taliban and prohibits trade-related transactions by United States persons involving the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.”   www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010702-10.html

Please discuss the American government’s role and position, either officially or unofficially in discussions/negotiations with the Taliban in 2001 and their timing and appropriateness with respect to the executive order of July 2, 2001 mentioned above. According to an article in Salon, 6-05-02:

“The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.”  www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/05/memo/index_np.html

X

X

X

   • Who else was involved in those discussions/negotiations?

X

   • What was the outcome?

X

   • What promises or threats were made?

X

31. Please discuss the National Security Presidential Directive presented for your approval on September 9, 2001, which outlined plans for attacking al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

"[Plans had been drawn up by the] Clinton administration to launch an attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Those plans were shelved when Bush took office, but were revived and accelerated in August 2001, following the breakdown of the pipeline negotiations. By the beginning of September 2001, the war plans had been approved by the Pentagon. On September 9 a National Security Presidential Directive outlining plans for an attack the following month, was presented to President Bush for approval."  www.pmdtc.org/docs/frnotices/66FR23310.PDF

jimpivonka.com/unpublished/forbiddentruthrev.html

www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,556279,00.html

   • Who else was involved in those discussions/negotiations?

X

   • What was the outcome?

X

   • What promises or threats were made?

X

32. Please explain your 14 month opposition to the creation of an independent commission to investigate 9/11 and your request to Senator Daschle to quash such an investigation.  

X

33. Please explain the reasoning which prompted the Executive Order governing the release of Presidential Records, including those of previous administrations, which could conceivably include historically important documents pertinent to the September 11th investigation.   www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs/pdf_inves/pdf_admin_records_let.pdf

X

34. When did you first become aware of “Rebuilding America’s Defenses”( RAD) proposed by the New American Century’s (PNAC)? Who introduced it to you?

X

35. After September 11th, you seemed to have fully embraced the RAD plan. Please comment on these observations:

"Bush has virtually used, word for word, the written statements by PNAC members when he speaks publicly about Iraq crisis” www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0227hellbent.htm

X

“Already we are seeing evidence of PNAC influence on U.S. policy. For instance, the concept of "Homeland Defense" comes straight from "RAD." Iran, Iraq and North Korea, nations that George Bush calls the "Axis of Evil", are listed together in "RAD" several times as possible military threats to the U.S. There is a suggestion that military spending be increased to 3.8 percent of the GDP, exactly the amount (over and above present expenses for the Iraqi campaign) Bush has proposed for next year's budget. Its basic statement of policy bespeaks and advocates the very essence of the idea of preemptive engagement… Bush's National Security Strategy of September 20, 2002, adopted PNAC ideas and emphasized a broadened definition of preemption… There is even assertion of the necessity of American political leadership overriding that of the U.N. (p. 11), a policy that was sadly played out when the U.S. invaded Iraq without the approval of either the U.N. or the international community.”

36. On February 29, 2004, the Seattle Times ran this headline “U.S. changes tactics, adds forces in hunt for bin Laden” and went on to say, “President Bush has approved a plan to intensify the effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden…” Please explain why there has not been a consistently intense push since September 11th to capture or kill bin Laden. www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/text/2001867838_binladen29.html

X

37. Why was author, Bob Woodward, author of Bush at War permitted access to confidential PDBs while the Joint Inquiry, and subsequently, the Commission, was not?   www.video.msnbc.com/id/4304339

www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2003/03/030403.html

X

38. Please explain why the White House has not demanded that the 19 recommendations made by the Joint Inquiry either be fully enacted or discussed via hearings?

X

39. What type of federal rescue measures are in place in the event of an attack on our nation, in terms of personnel and equipment?

X

Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States

1. Please discuss the advice and plans of the Energy Advisory Council specifically as they relate to pipeline development and gas/oil exploration in Afghanistan, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, and the feasibility of such development or exploration specifically in those two countries in 2001.   www.dcd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/2002/Bates/02-340.pdf

X

2., Please describe any discussions/negotiations between the Taliban and either public or private agents prior to September 11th regarding Osama bin Laden and/or rights to pass a pipeline through Afghanistan, or any other subject pertaining to Afghanistan.

X

• Specifically, what were the discussions/negotiations about?

X

• Expand upon the discussions, agreements, or threatening remarks that were reportedly made? www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/05/memo/index_np.html www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,556279,00.html

X

3. On the morning of September 11th, when did you first become aware that America was under attack? Who informed you?

X

4. Besides ensuring the succession to the Presidency, is there a defense protocol to follow in the event our nation is attacked? Was it followed?

www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/nd01/nd01schwartz.html www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/fpc-65.htm

X

5. What subsequent actions did you take to defend our nation?

X

•Did you have open lines with the Secret Service, NORAD, the FAA and DOD?

X

•Who was in the Situation Room with you?

X

•Was Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or anyone at the Pentagon informed that we were under attack? If so, at what time was the Pentagon informed? If not Rumsfeld, who?

X

•Why wasn’t the Pentagon defended?

X

•Did you consult with President Bush about all decisions?

X

6. Was the order given to shoot down Flight 93?

X

7. Please explain your opposition to the creation of an independent commission to investigate 9/11 and your request that Senator Daschle quash an investigation.

X

8. The Hart Rudman Report was released in January, 2001, which predicted a catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States. Yet the White House apparently set aside the recommendations and announced in May that you would study the issue of domestic terrorism. Apparently, responsibility for dealing with the problem was then passed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency Director, Joe Allbaugh. Congress had been willing to support the recommendations. dir.salon.com/politics/feature/2001/09/12/bush/index.html

www.mipt.org/srchnatlstrat03272001c.asp

•In addressing the issue of domestic terrorism, which you were asked to oversee by President Bush in May, 2001, whom did you consult and/or from whom did you request briefings?

X

•What were your findings on the threat level?

X

•What recommendations for improved security resulted from your study of domestic terrorism? When were they made and to whom?

X

•What coordinated plans of action, directives or protocols developed as a result?

X

•Were those recommendations carried out following the September 11th attacks? www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/frp/frp2003.pdf

X

9. Why were the recommendations of the Hart Rudman Report ignored? dir.salon.com/politics/feature/2001/09/12/bush/index.html

X

10. Were you given Cipro on the evening of September 11? If so, why?

“At least some White House personnel were given Cipro six weeks ago. White House officials won't discuss that, or who might be receiving the anthrax-treating antibiotic now…

On the night of the Sept. 11 attacks, the White House Medical Office dispensed Cipro to staff accompanying Vice President Dick Cheney as he was secreted off to the safety of Camp David, and told them it was a precaution, according to one person directly involved.” www.unansweredquestions.net/timeline/2001/ap102401.html

X

11. Please provide the names of anyone else who received Cipro in advance of the anthrax attacks.

X

12. What level of support can the 9/11 Commission expect with regard to enacting the changes that they recommend?

X

================================

Questions for National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice

================================

1. Beginning with the transition period between the Clinton and Bush administrations, and ending on 9/11/01, specifically what information/ warnings about terrorists, planned attacks and targets had you received?

X

This would include briefings or communications from:

    •  outgoing Clinton officials

X

    •  the CIA, FBI, NSA and other intelligence agencies

X

    •  foreign intelligence, governments, dignitaries or envoys

X

    •  Former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman  dir.salon.com/politics/feature/2001/09/12/bush/index.html

X

2. Please describe your role in the preparation of daily Presidential Briefings. Did you ever summarize or revise the information provided by the intelligence agencies?

X

3. Regarding the meeting of Abdullah Abdullah (close aide to Massoud and now the Afghan Foreign Minister) in July , 2001, with “some top National Security Council (NSC) and State Department officials,” what information about al Qaeda did he convey? www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,333835,00.html

4. Specifically, what warnings did you receive from Sandy Berger and the Clinton administration?  www.time.com/time/magazine/article/subscriber/0,10987,1101020812-333890,00.html

X

5. After the revelation of the Aug 6th Presidential Daily Briefing which warned that terrorists may hijack planes, you explained,

“It was an analytic report that talked about UBL’s [bin Laden's] methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998.

It mentioned hijacking, but hijacking in the traditional sense and, in a sense, said that the most important and most likely thing was that they would take over an airliner, holding passengers and demand the release of one of their operatives.”  www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/16/rice.sept11

Comment: Al Qaeda attacks have one goal--- killing as many people as possible, usually in a spectacular way. Further, al Qaeda’s attacks are often lethal, well-planned, simultaneous strikes against symbolic or high-profile targets. Those characteristics are inconsistent with the conclusion that the most likely scenario would be hijackings in the traditional sense, especially when coupled with bin Laden’s declaration in 1998 that "every American should be a target for Muslims,” and that it is “the duty of Muslims to confront, fight, and kill British and American citizens.”  www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/bostonglobe052602.html

Please describe the analysis of al Qaeda methods of operation and what bin Laden had done historically which led you to conclude that an al Qaeda attack would be simple hijackings?

X

Questions For Dr. Rice from the Joint
Intelligence Committee Inquiry Appendix

1. As stated in the Appendix of the Joint Inquiry of Congress’ Final Report:

“Despite the White House decision [to deny access to the PDBs], the Joint Inquiry was advised by Intelligence Community representatives of the content of an August 2001 PDB item that is discussed in the report. This glimpse into that PDB indicated the importance of such access:

*National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin’s methods of operation from a historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to hijack an airliner in order to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives. She stated, however, that the report did not contain specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and did not contain information that al-Qa’ida was discussing a particular planned attack against a specific target at any specific time, place, or by any specific method.” (Joint Inquiry Final Report, Appendix, "Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry," pages 1-2).

Ms. Rice can you reconcile this intimated discrepancy?

X

Terrorism as a Policy Priority

1. During your time as National Security Advisor, what priorities did you establish for U.S. Intelligence priorities and where did terrorism fit in?

X

•  How did this change from the priorities of the Clinton administration?

X

2. How were these priorities conveyed to the intelligence Community?

X

•  Did the intelligence Community propose any changes in priority with regard to counterterrorism or al-Qa’ida?

X

•  What were they?

X

3. Prior to September 11, who at the National Security Council and the U.S. government played a leading role in setting counterterrorism policy?

X

•  Who else was involved in this process? Please describe the process, the participants and the fora.

X

4. Prior to September 11, did Congress support the NSC’s counterterrorism efforts? Did Congress oppose NSC priorities related to terrorism in any way? Please provide details of both, as appropriate.

X

5. Was Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for counterterrorism, included all in Principals’ meetings related to terrorism after January 2002?

X

•  If not, why not?

X

•  How was it determined who would be involved in such meetings?

X

•  What was his role in counterterrorism policy and intelligence prioritization after January 2002?

X

6. During the transition from the Clinton administration, did former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger or other senior Clinton NSC officials provide any advice, information, warning, or guidance requiring policy, priorities, or threats from al-Qa’ida and Bin Ladin?

X

•  If so, what was the advice, information, warning, or guidance?

X

7. Prior to September 11, was the Administration engaged in a review of counterterrorism policy?

X

•  What issues were identified for change?

X

•  What stage were plans in?

X

•  What changes in the role of the intelligence Community, if any, were planned?

X

•  What happened to the review after the September 11 attacks?

X

8. When the new Administration came into office, was it aware that Usama bin Ladin had declared war on the United States in 1998?

X

•  Who provided this information, and how was it provided?

X

•  What was the impact of that fact on the Administration’s national security priorities?

X

•  How did it affect the intelligence Community’s posture?

9. Prior to September 11, did the President or other senior officials in the administration make any public statements or give any speeches on the subject of the threat of terrorism, or Usama bin Ladin’s terrorist network in particular? If so, please make copies available to the (Joint Inquiry Staff)?

Resources

1. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community come to the new Administration with any requests for additional counterterrorism resources, e.g. additional funding? Who made the request, and what was the nature of the proposal?

2. Did the Intelligence Community ask the Administration for more resources to fight Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida? Who made this request?

3. Did the Intelligence Community ever cite a lack of resources as the basis for not acting? If so, provide details and the NSC response.

4. When the DCI, Director of NSA, and FBI Director requested more counterterrorism resources, what was the stated justification for their requests?

5. What was the NSC’s response to each specific Intelligence Community request for any increases in resources for counterterrorism? For al-Qa’ida?

Agency responsiveness and support for policy makers

1. What specific strengths did you observe in intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting on Bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida or terrorism in general prior to September 11? What specific weaknesses? Please provide specific examples of each.

X

2. What was the quality of intelligence received by the NSC? Did the NSC make any efforts to improve this quality?

X

3. With respect to Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts prior

to September 11, how responsive were the CIA, the FBI, NSA, and DIA?

    •  Did they provide the President and the National Security Council with the information needed to make informed decisions?

    •  Did the agencies use their authority aggressively? Did they cite limits or a lack of authority as a basis for no action?

    •  Did they shift resources appropriately in response to NSC direction?

    •  Did the NSC provide any specific tasking to Intelligence Community agencies to which they did not respond? Please provide specific examples.

Threat to the homeland

1. Prior to September 11, including especially spring/summer 2001, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council, orally or in writing, indicating the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the United States?

X

2. Prior to September 11, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council on al-Qa’ida activities and infrastructure inside the United States?

X

3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever consider alerting the American people to the internal threat from al-Qa’ida? What happened?

X

4. Did the National Security Council ever consider enhancing U.S. border controls, e.g., by strengthening watchlist programs, alerting the FAA or the airlines, or inspecting cargo containers on a larger scale? If so, what happened?

X

5. Prior to September 11, what was the National Security council’s view regarding how well postured the FBI was with respect to combating terrorist groups inside the United States? What steps were taken to improve the FBI, if any?

X

6. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community provide the NSC with any information regarding the possibility that al-Qa’ida members would use airplanes as weapons or hijack airplanes in the United States? What did the NSC do in response to this information?

X

Foreign governments

1. Prior to September 11, which foreign governments were most and least helpful regarding counterterrorism? How were they helpful or not helpful in each case?

X

2. Prior to September 11, were the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supportive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts? How responsive were European allies? What priority was counterterrorism cooperation in Saudi Arabia relative to military operations against Iraq, the Middle East peace negotiations, and other concerns?

X

3. Did Intelligence Community agencies ask for NSC assistance in getting foreign governments to take action against terrorist cells? Did the NSC take any specific actions to support the Intelligence Community? What did the NSC do? Did the NSC ask or instruct the State Department or the Department of Defense to assist the intelligence Community in this regard?

X

4. Prior to September 11, was there any discussion of increasing information sharing and/or counterterrorism cooperation with the Sudan?

Use of Force/Overt and Covert

1. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council consider the use of military force against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan? How? In what form? Why was it not pursued? Was there sufficient intelligence to support military options? Was their tasking to gain further intelligence to support military operations?

X

2. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council issue any tasking to the CIA or the U.S. military to develop plans involving the covert or overt use of force?

X

3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever review the CIA’s authorities to conduct covert action against Bin Ladin or al-Qa’ida? What problems were identified regarding existing authorities, [-----------]? Were there any proposals to change those authorities before September 11th? What steps were taken?

X

4. Prior to September 11, was the unarmed Predator flown in Afghanistan after the Bush Administration came into office? Were proposals made to the NSC to fly it? Which participants favored flying it? If it was not flown, why not?

X

5. Did the National Security Council support the development of the armed Predator? Did any administration official try to expedite the process? Were any discussions held on this issue at the NSC? Who participated?

X

6. Did you consider [------------]? Why or why not? What impact did you expect?

7. Why was there no military response to the attack on the USS Cole? Was this considered?

X

Recommendations

1. What recommendations would you make to improve the intelligence community’s performance?

X

FSC Recommended List of Witnesses and Questions
Revised March 18, 2004

Part 2: Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

George Tenet, Director of the CIA

1. Why didn't the CIA share vital information about the terrorists with the FBI?

X

2. Is the October 31, 2001 story by Le Figaro true which wrote of Osama bin Laden meeting with a CIA officer in Dubai in July, 2001?

globalresearch.ca/articles/RIC111B.html

X

• If so, why wasn’t he taken into custody?

X

* Recommendation: The Commission should contact Dr, Terry Callaway, the Canadian surgeon, reported to have been treating Bin Laden at the Dubai hospital for a kidney disorder, to request information about bin Laden’s medical condition and about whether he is aware of a meeting between bin Laden and a local CIA operative in July , 2001.

X

The Commission should also interview that Dubai CIA operative who was recalled to headquarters on July 15, 2001.

X

3. According Senator Ike Skelton (D- Missouri) in an interview on National Public Radio on the morning of September 11th, 2001, you had recently warned Congress of an imminent attack… “So this is not entirely unexpected.”

www.thememoryhole.org/tenet-911.htm

X

•What intelligence prompted you to draw that conclusion?

X

•When was this information shared with Congress?

X

•Specifically, what information about an imminent attack was shared with Congress?

X

•Was any of this information shared with any member of the National Security Council?

X

        · If so, when was it shared?

X

        ·What information was provided?

X

        ·Which members were briefed?

X

• Was anyone at the National Security Agency, or any other intelligence agency, or the Department of Defense briefed on this information? If so, when?

X

4. Re: Mohammed Atta: It has been reported that Atta was on multiple watch lists. How did he slip through CIA surveillance?

X

•Please produce a timeline of Atta’s travels

X

• Atta was in Portland, Maine on September 10, 2001. What was he doing there?

X

5. Why weren’t all suspected terrorists and wanted terrorists placed on watch lists to prevent them from entering our country? Why wasn’t this information shared with the INS guarding our borders?

X

From The Complete 9/11 Timeline, Part 2: Jan. 2001-Sept. 11, 2001 by Paul Thompson:

“January 4, 2001: The FBI's investigation into the USS Cole bombing learns that terrorist Khallad bin Atash had been a principal planner of the bombing [AP, 9/21/02], and that two other participants in the bombing had delivered money to bin Atash at the time of the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). The FBI shares this information with the CIA, and when CIA analysts reexamine pictures from the Malaysian meeting to learn more about this, they find a picture of him standing next to hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, Newsweek, 6/2/02] The CIA is aware that Almihdhar entered the US a year earlier, yet they don't attempt to find him. CNN later notes that at this point the CIA at least "could have put Alhazmi and Almihdhar and all others who attended the meeting in Malaysia on a watch list to be kept out of this country. It was not done." [CNN, 6/4/02] More incredibly, even bin Atash is not placed on the watch list at this time, despite being labeled as the principal planner of the Cole bombing. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02]  ”

unansweredquestions.net/timeline/main/timelinebefore911.html  [excerpt from webpage]

6. Given the testimony in the trial in May, 2001 (below) were flight schools advised to be vigilant for Middle Eastern men training to be pilots and advised to report anything unusual? If not, please explain.

X

“MAY 29, 2001 Four men are convicted in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Witnesses testified at the trial that Osama bin Laden was sending al Qaeda agents to the United States for flight-school training and acquiring planes.”

www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/21/phoenix.memo/

[See sidebar—EXTRA INFORMATION, Timeline: Who Knew What and When? Using yellow arrow, navigate to “May 29, 2001”]

7. What information did the CIA receive from foreign entities about al Qaeda members, other potential terrorists, and plans to attack America within the Continental United States? With whom in our government did the CIA share this information?

X

8. Did any foreign intelligence agencies translate the September 10th intercepts about tomorrow being the zero day prior to September 11th?

X

•If so, when did they communicate that information to our security agencies?

X

•Who received that information?

X

•What did they do with it?

X

9. Did the CIA receive a translation of this communication or any other communication which specified the date, plan or targets from any source (foreign intelligence agency, foreign government, diplomat etc.?)

X

10. Considering the high volume of traffic and multiple warnings from foreign governments, why didn’t the CIA anticipate and recommend defensive measures to thwart the impending attack?

X

11. There were an extraordinarily large number of stock puts on American and United airlines stock and others which were subsequently impacted by the terrorist attack.

“It is well documented that the CIA has long monitored such trades – in real time – as potential warnings of terrorist attacks and other economic moves contrary to U.S. interests.

www.hereinreality.com/insidertrading.html

•Was the CIA monitoring the financial markets in the weeks preceding September 11th? If so, via what system and/or software were the markets monitored?

X

•Was such activity viewed as a warning of an impending attack?

X

•Did the CIA, in coordination with other agencies, both domestic and abroad, investigate the purchasers of those stock puts?

X

•Please provide the names of those individuals, investment groups and others who purchased the stock puts in question and the reasons they gave for anticipating a drop in the stocks of companies which coincidentally happened to have been severely impacted on September 11th.

X

12. Was our national security compromised by convicted spy Robert Hanssen’s sale of Promis software to Russia?

X

13. How did Promis software end up in the hands of bin Laden? In what ways could Promis be useful to al Qaeda?

www.unansweredquestions.org/timeline/2001/foxnews101601.html

X

14. Given that the attack was apparently known in the Muslim community, (based on the following information) how is it that our intelligence agents did not know of the impending attack?

• A Palestinian youth pointed to the Towers and indicated that they wouldn’t be standing week www.msnbc.com/news/642164.asp#BODY

• members of a Brooklyn mosque were warned www.thedossier.ukonline.co.uk...

X

15. Please explain the role of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, in aiding bin Laden and/or the al Qaeda from 1998 through the present.

“Between 1980 and the end of the Afghan/Soviet war in 1989, the CIA and Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence] recruited some 35,000 Muslim radicals join Afghanistan's fight. The US and Saudi Arabia gave up to $40 billion total to support the mujaheddin guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians. Most of the money is managed by the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency. At the same time, Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid for the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, with the advice and support of the Saudi royal family. The CIA, the ISI and Osama continued to work together against the Soviets until the end of the war."

pages.infinit.net/fmgoyeau/911pak02.html

X

16. “Aboard Flight 93, passenger Thomas Burnett told his wife, Deena, in a 9:27 a.m. cell-phone call: "The hijackers have already knifed a guy, one of them has a gun, and they are telling us there is a bomb on board.” www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/6742902.htm

Did anyone else on any flight report that the terrorists had a gun?

X

17. Why isn't America cooperating in the prosecution of terrorists worldwide, such as the German trial of Abdelghani Mzoudi?

www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=4498671§ion=news

X

Family Steering Committee Questions
for Thomas Pickard and Louis Freeh
March 18, 2004

Tom Pickard
acting FBI Director
June 23, 2001- September 3, 2001

1. What information on al Qaeda and possible terrorist plans did you receive during your tenure as acting FBI director?

X

•Who provided this information?

X

•What did you do with this information?

X

•Did you inform incoming director Mueller?

X

•Did you inform anyone on the National Security Council?

X

•How often did you receive briefings from the New York field office which was the focal point of the terrorist investigation?

X

2. Please explain why the July 10, 2001, Phoenix memo got no farther than FBI headquarters.

X

3. How long was agent Wright in possession of the information before he reported it?

X

•Please verify that the memo was sent to the New York Field office which was the clearinghouse for intelligence on suspected Middle Eastern terrorists.

X

•Did you receive any response/request for further action from John O’Neill, head of the Counterterrorism unit there?

X

•Why wasn’t the Phoenix memo shared with “threat subgroup” of the interagency Counterterrorism Security Group? www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename
=article&node=&contentId=A30176-2002May16¬Found=true

X

3. Please discuss the briefing(s) and updates on terrorism given you by retiring director Freeh as you prepared to assume the position of acting Director.

X

4. Did you communicate critical information about terrorist surveillance and warnings to incoming Director Mueller? How was this information communicated—via personal meeting, phone, letter/FAX, e-mail? Do you have copies of any written documents?

X

5. In the June 12, 2001, Diamondback sting operation, involving illegal arms purchases for Pakistan, the Taliban and bin Laden,

“Federal agents involved in the case later express puzzlement that Washington higher-ups didn't make the case a higher priority, pointing out that bin Laden could have gotten a nuclear bomb if the deal was for real. Agents on the case complain that the FBI didn't make the case a counter-terrorism matter, which would have improved bureaucratic backing and opened access to FBI information and US intelligence from around the world.”

•Why wasn’t Diamondback made a counter-terrorism case?

unansweredquestions.org/timeline/main/randyglass.html

X

Louis Freeh
Former FBI Director
September 1, 1993-June, 2001

1. What information on al Qaeda and possible terrorist plans did you receive during your tenure as FBI director?

X

•Who provided this information?

X

•What did you do with this information?

X

•Did you inform anyone on the National Security Council?

X

2. Did you communicate critical information about terrorist surveillance and warnings to incoming either acting Director Pickard or in-coming Director Mueller?

X

3. Did you discuss the terrorism, including information from terrorist surveillance and warnings, with Attorney General John Ashcroft? What was his response? How was this information communicated — via personal meeting, phone, letter/FAX, e-mail? Do you have copies of any written documents?

X

4. Why wasn't all data relevant on terrorists sent to NYC field office?

X

5. What information was provided to you by John O’Neill, head of the Counterterrorism unit?

X

6. When was ALEX disbanded and why?

www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/020114fa_FACT1

X

7. Why weren’t the flight schools shut down, or the terrorists deported, if the “FBI Knew Terrorists Were Using Flight Schools” for years, as reported in the Washington Post, September 23, 2001.

X

8. The Federal Code specifically assigns the FAA Administrator and the F.B.I. Director joint responsibility for domestic aviation security.

www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/49/44904.html

•When were Logan, Dulles and Newark airports, the three airports from which the terrorists departed, last evaluated prior to September 11th?

X

•What were the observations, conclusions and recommendations at each airport?

X

•Were there follow-up assessments in the case of deficiencies?

X

•Are the nation’s airports routinely assessed?

X

•Is there a written plan coordinating the activities of the FAA , US Customs, INS and other law enforcement personnel?

X

9. In the June 12, 2001, Diamondback sting operation, involving illegal arms purchases for Pakistan, the Taliban and bin Laden,

“Federal agents involved in the case later express puzzlement that Washington higher-ups didn't make the case a higher priority, pointing out that bin Laden could have gotten a nuclear bomb if the deal was for real. Agents on the case complain that the FBI didn't make the case a counter-terrorism matter, which would have improved bureaucratic backing and opened access to FBI information and US intelligence from around the world.” unansweredquestions.org/timeline/main/randyglass.html

•Why wasn’t Diamondback made a counter-terrorism case?

X

X

Counter-Terrorism Security Group (C.S.G.)
Richard Clarke
Director of the C.S.G.

"It all came together in the third week in June," [Richard] Clarke said. "The C.I.A.'s view was that a major terrorist attack was coming in the next several weeks." On July 5th, Clarke summoned all the domestic security agencies —the Federal Aviation Administration, the Coast Guard, Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the F.B.I.—and told them to increase their security in light of an impending attack. ”  www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0302/S00079.htm

1. What information did you have that led you to believe an attack was imminent?

X

2. Please describe all information which was conveyed in that meeting?

X

3. Who attended the meeting?

X

4. Were plans made to implement immediate counter-measures to deflect an attack?

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/subscriber/0,10987,1101020812-333890,00.html

X

•  If so, what were they? If not, why not?

X

5. Since the intelligence community was extremely concerned about the possiblity of an attack, why didn't all the agencies work together and share information in a coordinated, collaborative effort, in order to locate the terrorists and prevent the attack?

X

6. Did you seek information about the terrorists from the FBI counter-terrorism unit in New York?

X

7. Why weren't the American people warned?

X